- UANOG - uanog.one

zaurus
by Igor Grabin 01 Sep '06

01 Sep '06

Утро добрым не бывает, никто не в курсе, как в этой стране можно подержаться за subj? гугль что-то говорит, что никак :-( -- Igor "CacoDem0n" Grabin, http://violent.death.kiev.ua/ =================================================================== uanog mailing list. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo(a)uanog.kiev.ua with "unsubscribe uanog" in the body of the message

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�� Threshold �� Ethernet �� ?
by Yury Yaroshevsky 01 Sep '06

01 Sep '06

Добрый день. Возникает такая ситуация на Catalyst WS-C3560G-24TS: Aug 31 09:38:00.377 EEST: %ETHCNTR-3-HALF_DUX_COLLISION_EXCEED_THRESHOLD: Collisions at GigabitEthernet0/5 exceed threshold. Considered as loop-back. Aug 31 09:38:00.377 EEST: %PM-4-ERR_DISABLE: loopback error detected on Gi0/5, putting Gi0/5 in err-disable state Aug 31 09:38:01.408 EEST: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface GigabitEthernet0/5, changed state to down Aug 31 09:38:02.415 EEST: %LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface GigabitEthernet0/5, changed state to down Aug 31 09:42:24.148 EEST: %PM-4-ERR_RECOVER: Attempting to recover from loopback err-disable state on Gi0/5 Aug 31 09:42:28.384 EEST: %LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface GigabitEthernet0/5, changed state to up Aug 31 09:42:29.391 EEST: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface GigabitEthernet0/5, changed state to up Aug 31 09:42:30.389 EEST: %ETHCNTR-3-HALF_DUX_COLLISION_EXCEED_THRESHOLD: Collisions at GigabitEthernet0/5 exceed threshold. Considered as loop-back. Поиск по документации привел к : Error Message ETHCNTR-3-HALF_DUX_COLLISION_EXCEED_THRESHOLD: Collision at [chars] exceed threshold. Consider as loop-back. Explanation This message means that the collisions at a half-duplex port exceeded the threshold, and the port is considered as a loopback. [chars] is the port where the threshold was exceeded. Как бы можно было задрать THRESHOLD в большее значение? Железка которая включена в этот порт работает жестко в 10M/Half и управляет потоком по backpressue и представляет из себя INV Mux (4xE1 -> Eth). Работают все 4xE1. Мукс никак не конфигурируется (тупой). Во время возникновения проблемы среднее по трафику составляет от ~3.5-4 до 5-6 Mbit (по графикам). В другие моменты времени нагрузка, без возникновения таких проблем, поднимается до 6-7 Mbit. Допускаю что возможно возникает резкий всплеск трафика который INV Mux пытается при помощи колизий притормозить. Как бы можно было задрать значение Threshold по колизиям в большее значение? =================================================================== uanog mailing list. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo(a)uanog.kiev.ua with "unsubscribe uanog" in the body of the message

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Тут уценка вроде как производится у нас. Есть всякие дивайсы полезные. Кошки в т.ч. И много всякого такого прочего.
by Hrynchuk Oleh 31 Aug '06

31 Aug '06

Превед коллеги. Сабдж. Среди сетевых шелезяк есть шасси маршрутизаторов 3745, СРЕшки LRE'шные, мудемы, различные модули для кошкиных маршрутизаторов (NM-*, VIC-*, WIC-*), коммутаторов (GBIC'и), Cisco AIRoNet'ы, мониторы всякие разные и много-много всякого прочего. Кому интересно - пишите запросы по номенклатуре и ценам на нач. отдела закупок Качана Сергея Александровича: Sergey.Kachan(a)incom.ua (рабочий телефон 538-00-68). Пусть он отсылает вам перечень объектов. Кстати, торг с ним очень даже уместен (это мне так сказали сведущие люди :)))). Ну и крайне убедительно прошу - от сего письма МЕНЯ НИ РАЗУ ПО ДАННОМУ ВОПРОСУ НЕ БЕСПОКОИТЬ! Regards, /oleh R&D Department, principal engineer =================================================================== uanog mailing list. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo(a)uanog.kiev.ua with "unsubscribe uanog" in the body of the message

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ppp timeout на Virtual Template на циске
by Alexander Shikoff 31 Aug '06

31 Aug '06

Приветствую! Поднял на Cisco 2811 L2TP-сервер доступа. Теперь стоит задача сделать так, чтобы клиенты не отваливались при простое соединения минут 10-15. Пишу: interface Virtual-Template1 ppp timeout idle 600 Клиент отваливается через 1-2 минуты после установки соединения. Куда рыть? Заранее спасибо! -- Kind Regards, Alexander Shikoff AMS1-UANIC =================================================================== uanog mailing list. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo(a)uanog.kiev.ua with "unsubscribe uanog" in the body of the message

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FW: [Announcement] CiscoR DDoS Multidevice Manager 1.0 (MDM) Now Available
by Hrynchuk Oleh 30 Aug '06

30 Aug '06

Забавна приблуда. Може й дійсно корисною виявиться... ________________________________ Subject: [Announcement] CiscoR DDoS Multidevice Manager 1.0 (MDM) Now Available Colleagues, We are pleased to announce the availability of Cisco® DDoS MultiDevice Manager 1.0. The Cisco® DDoS Multidevice Manager 1.0 is a management software application that meets the growing security requirements of customer deployments that involve several guards and detectors, in geographically disperse locations. The Cisco DDoS Multidevice Manager 1.0 provides a powerful consolidated view of attack information across multiple guards and detectors, enabling customers to more intelligently handle them. The Cisco DDoS Multidevice Manager 1.0 application runs on a Linux server. It features an intuitive, Web-based GUI that provides easy access to a consolidated view of the size, type, and other characteristics of the attacks, both in real time and as reports that can be accessed at a later time for analysis. The DDoS Multidevice Manager 1.0 also provides the ability to distribute basic zone-level configuration to a predefined set of devices from a user-configurable master device. The Cisco DDoS MultiDevice Manager 1.0 is a FREE product! FEATURES AND BENEFITS The primary features of the Cisco DDoS MultiDevice Manager 1.0 include: • Displays a consolidated view of ongoing and past attacks on all zones • Displays consolidated statistical information related to all zones and devices • Creates aggregated reports • Synchronizes zone information from one device with other devices in the network • Activates anomaly detection on the entire set of zones on detectors in the network • Activates zone protection (attack mitigation) on all of the guards in the network • Activates the learning process on one or all of the zones on detectors in the network CCO Product Information Page: The product page is located at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps7020/index.html <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps7020/index.html> You will find the following collateral on this page: Data Sheet, Presentation, Q&A Product Documentation The product configuration guide and release notes are located at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps7020/tsd_products_support_series_home… <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps7020/tsd_products_support_series_home…> CCO Download Location: The Cisco DDoS MultiDevice Manager 1.0 is a FREE product and can be downloaded from the following location: http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/mdm-3des <http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/mdm-3des>

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А что кто скажет про новые Dynamix UM-S модемы?
by Mykola Dzham 30 Aug '06

30 Aug '06

Использует кто новые "голубенькие" Dynamix UM-S в route mode + nat ? Что-то у меня начинает складываться впечатление что они склонны подлипать в отличие от старых UM-S . -- Mykola Dzham, LEFT-(UANIC|RIPE) JID: levsha(a)jabber.net.ua =================================================================== uanog mailing list. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo(a)uanog.kiev.ua with "unsubscribe uanog" in the body of the message

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Может кому надо...
by Alexander V Soroka 30 Aug '06

30 Aug '06

Привет ! Тут знакомые решили распродать то что у них пылиться на складе, может кому-то из вас это будет интересно: Лот 1: СДМА аппараты CTL-800 - в комплекте. долгов на них нет. Лот 2: Cellulink 301 - 3 штуки, в каждом можно по 3 мобилки поставить. + QUINTUM модель A800? (там на жопе A400/A800 - "А400" зачеркнуто) 2 штуки таких. -- Best regards, Alexander V Soroka http://www.unet.net.ua AS106-RIPE http://www.spacegate.kiev.ua mailto:alex@euro.net.ua =================================================================== uanog mailing list. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo(a)uanog.kiev.ua with "unsubscribe uanog" in the body of the message

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RE: Re: FW: [Announcement] CiscoR DDoS Multidevice Manager 1.0 (MDM) Now Available
by Hrynchuk Oleh 29 Aug '06

29 Aug '06

> -----Original Message----- > From: owner-uanog-outgoing(a)uanog.kiev.ua > [mailto:owner-uanog-outgoing@uanog.kiev.ua] On Behalf Of > Vladimir (Doka) Litovka > Sent: Tuesday, August 29, 2006 11:22 AM > To: Andrew Stesin > Cc: uanog(a)uanog.kiev.ua > Subject: [uanog] Re: FW: [Announcement] CiscoR DDoS > Multidevice Manager 1.0 (MDM) Now Available > > Давайте попросим дяденьку Нетча сделать рассылку > news(a)uanog.kiev.ua и туда можно будет постить любые новости о > сетевых технологиях, новых решениях, > конференциях/форумах/сайтах/пр., т.е. все, что подписанные на > эту рассылку люди будут считать интересной остальным новостью. > Ну тоді вже щось на зразок technology-news@uanog... Бо просто "news@uanog..." поняття неоднозначне :)) =================================================================== uanog mailing list. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo(a)uanog.kiev.ua with "unsubscribe uanog" in the body of the message

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Порекомендуйте, пожалуйста, ADSL-концентратор
by Vladimir Melnik 28 Aug '06

28 Aug '06

Здравствуйте. Я был бы рад, если бы кто-то поделился отзывами об ADSL-концентраторах на базе ZyXEL IES-1000. Я имел дело с модулями SHDSL (SAM-1008), и нахожу их работу весьма стабильной; интересно, что кто скажет об AAM-1008. Также интересно, насколько хорош DYNAMIX DC-16A/SA: использует ли кто их у себя? Заранее благодарен. -- V.Melnik =================================================================== uanog mailing list. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo(a)uanog.kiev.ua with "unsubscribe uanog" in the body of the message

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FW: Cisco Security Advisory: Unintentional Password Modification in Cisco Firewall Products
by Vladimir Litovka (vlitovka) 28 Aug '06

28 Aug '06

FYI -- /doka -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Unintentional Password Modification in Cisco Firewall Products Document ID: 70811 Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20060823-firewall http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060823-firewall.shtml Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2006 August 23 1600 UTC (GMT) - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Contents ======== Summary Affected Products Details Impact Software Version and Fixes Workarounds Obtaining Fixed Software Exploitation and Public Announcements Status of this Notice: FINAL Distribution Revision History Cisco Security Procedures - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= Certain versions of the software for the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances, the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA), and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) are affected by a software bug that may cause the EXEC password, passwords of locally defined usernames, and the enable password in the startup configuration to be changed without user intervention. Unauthorized users can take advantage of this bug to try to gain access to a device that has been reloaded after passwords in its startup configuration have been changed. In addition, authorized users can be locked out and lose the ability to manage the affected device. Cisco has made free software available to address this issue for affected customers. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060823-firewall.shtml. Affected Products ================= Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances, the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances, and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers are impacted if they are running an affected software version. Vulnerable Products +------------------ The PIX 500 Series Security Appliances and the ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are affected when running any of the following software versions: * Any version (including interim versions) in the 7.0(x) train up to and including 7.0(5) * Any version (including interim versions) in the 7.1(x) train up to and including 7.1(2.4) The FWSM for the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is affected when running the following software version: * Any version (including interim versions) in the 3.1(x) train up to and including 3.1(1.6) Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The PIX 500 Series Security Appliances and the ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances are not affected when running any of the following software versions: * Any pre-7.x version (PIX only since the ASA does not run pre-7.x code) * 7.2(1) and later The FWSM for the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is not affected when running any of the following software versions: * Any 1.x and 2.x version * 3.1(2) and later No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this issue. Details ======= The Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances, the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances, and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers are part of Cisco's security portfolio. All of these products offer firewall services with stateful packet filtering and deep packet inspection. The PIX and ASA devices also offer other services like Virtual Private Networking (VPN), Content Filtering, and Intrusion Prevention. On these devices, authentication for both EXEC mode and enable mode can be performed based on Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) methods (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service [RADIUS], Terminal Access Controller Access Control System Plus [TACACS+], or LOCAL). If a device does not have any AAA method (i.e., RADIUS, TACACS+, or LOCAL) configured, authentication for EXEC mode is performed using the password configured with the "passwd" command, and authentication for enable mode is performed using the password configured with the "enable password" command. A software bug exists in certain versions of the software used by these devices that may cause, under some circumstances, the EXEC password, passwords of locally defined users, and the enable password that are stored in the startup configuration to be changed without user intervention. The startup configuration is stored in a non-volatile medium such as flash memory. The affected passwords are set using the following configuration commands: * passwd - configures the EXEC password. For example: pix(config)# passwd xxxxxxxxx * username - configures local users and their associated passwords. For example: pix(config)# username admin password xxxxxxxx * enable password - configures the password used to enter enable mode. For example: pix(config)# enable password xxxxxxxx The software bug is known to be triggered in only two scenarios: * A software crash, normally caused by a software bug. Please note that not all software crashes may cause the undesired results discussed above. * Two or more users making concurrent configuration changes on a device, regardless of the method (command-line interface [CLI], Adaptive Security Device Manager [ASDM], Firewall Management Center, etc.) used to access the device. Please note that the passwords in the startup configuration will be changed when the configuration is saved, to the non-volatile medium where the startup configuration is stored, via the "write memory" or "copy running-config startup-config" commands. During normal operation, if the running configuration is not saved, passwords in the startup configuration will not change. Once the passwords in the startup configuration are changed, administrators will be locked out after the next device reload if authentication for EXEC and for enable privilege depends on the passwords or local accounts stored in the startup configuration. If a AAA server (RADIUS or TACACS+) is used for authentication, the change of passwords in the startup configuration will only cause the undesired results when the AAA server is unavailable, regardless of whether the "LOCAL" authentication method is configured as a fallback, e.g. aaa authentication enable console RADIUS LOCAL. Passwords are changed to a non-random value. This behavior is not due to a hardcoded default password or other explicitly induced set of password values, but rather the result of a coding error related to configuration parsing. Devices configured in multiple context mode are also affected by this software bug. This issue is documented in the following Cisco bug IDs: * CSCse02703 for the PIX and ASA devices * CSCsd81487 for the FWSM Impact ====== The software issue may cause the EXEC password, password of locally defined users, and the enable password in the startup configuration to change without user's intervention. This will prevent administrators from logging in to the device if authentication is configured to use the passwords stored in the startup configuration. If a malicious user were able to guess the new password, and the device reloads, either automatically because of a software crash, or manually by the network administrator, unauthorized access to the device may be possible. Software Version and Fixes ========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. For version 7.0.x of the PIX/ASA software, the first fixed release is 7.0(5.1). The latest 7.0.x release for the PIX can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/pix?psrtdcat20e2 The latest 7.0.x release for the ASA can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/asa?psrtdcat20e2 For version 7.1.x of the PIX/ASA software, the first fixed release is 7.1(2.5). The latest 7.1.x interim for the PIX can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/pix-interim?psrtdcat20e2 The latest 7.1.x interim for the ASA can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/asa-interim?psrtdcat20e2 The first fixed release of the FWSM is 3.1(2). The latest 3.1 release of the FWSM software can be downloaded from: http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/cat6000-fwsm?psrtdcat20e2 Note: Interim images are not fully regression tested. Each individual fix has been unit tested, and the image has had a limited amount of automated regression testing to confirm a baseline of functionality. Keep this testing status in mind if you decide to run them in a production environment. We strongly encourage you to upgrade to a fully tested Maintenance or Feature release when it becomes available. Workarounds =========== Configuring authentication against an external RADIUS/TACACS+ server, per network security best practices, mitigates this issue. For information on how to configure authentication, please visit the following URLs: PIX/ASA: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/multisec/asa_sw/v_70/config… FWSM: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/cat6000/mod_icn/fwsm/fw… If the passwords in the startup configuration have been modified as a result of software crash or concurrent configuration update, the administrators will need to perform a password recovery procedure, unless external AAA authentication is configured. The password recovery procedure for the PIX and the ASA is documented at the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030/products_password_rec… The password recovery procedure for the FWSM is documented at the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/cat6000/mod_icn/fwsm/fw… In addition, it is possible to limit the exposure of the firewall device by permitting remote connections only from known, trusted IP addresses. This is accomplished via the "ssh", "telnet", and "http" commands for Secure Shell (SSH), Telnet, and Secure Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol (HTTPS) access, respectively. For additional information on this, please refer to the "Managing System Access" section of the Cisco Security Appliance CLI Configuration Guide, available at: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/multisec/asa_sw/v_70/config… In the case of the FWSM, please note that remote access to it can also be obtained via the Cisco Catalyst 6500 switch or Cisco 7600 Series router that hosts the FWSM blade. For this reason, the switch or router needs to be configured, using access control lists, to permit remote connections only from known, trusted IP addresses. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed software becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact either "psirt(a)cisco.com" or "security-alert(a)cisco.com" for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac(a)cisco.com Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the issue described in this advisory, although we are aware that some customers have been impacted by this software bug. This issue was brought to Cisco's attention by Terje Bless from Helse Nord IKT. Cisco would like to thank him for working with us towards coordinated disclosure of this issue. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060823-firewall.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce(a)cisco.com * first-teams(a)first.org * bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com * vulnwatch(a)vulnwatch.org * cisco(a)spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp(a)puck.nether.net * full-disclosure(a)lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco(a)newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +----------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2006-August-23 | public | | | | release. | +----------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.…. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- All contents are Copyright 1992-2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Aug 23, 2006 Document ID: 70811 - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.2.2 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFE7IN68NUAbBmDaxQRApWzAKCW7EBZGzQ/ZcqsF4XP17IM2sHb0ACeMh0h dfDxk0Oadi2rKlr48jicTLU= =XCV5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- =================================================================== uanog mailing list. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo(a)uanog.kiev.ua with "unsubscribe uanog" in the body of the message

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